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NOTES
When Congress Just Says No: Deterrence Theory
and the Inadequate Enforcement of the Federal
Election Campaign Act
MICHAEL W. CARROLL*
[In many cases,] violating the [campaign finance] law[s] has become the cost
of doing business.... [T]he classic conversation in the campaign room
consists of someone asking "We want to do this and this. What are the
consequences?"... [T]he lawyer responds by saying, "We cannot do that...
[a]fter the election, the FEC will go after you." To which the questioner asks,
"What is the fine?" Even if the penalty is a $20,000 fine, he is thinking, "But
this action will win the election." . . . The next day [the lawyer] get[s] [a]
phone call to the effect of "Listen, we should tell you what we just did,"
because in a political campaign the reality-winning-often is everything.'
INTRODUCTION
The 1996 presidential and congressional elections are expected to be the most
expensive in history,2 and fundraising efforts are well underway. Early success
in fundraising has decided advantages, including limiting the pool of challeng-
ers and assisting in future fundraising activities. While the incentives for early
and aggressive fundraising are many, candidates' efforts are not wholly unregu-
lated. The primary legal constraint on federal candidates' fundraising efforts is
the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).3 Although the FECA does not
regulate all sources of funds that support federal election campaigns,4 it imposes
* J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1996; A.B., University of Chicago, 1986. I would like to
thank Professor Louis Michael Seidman for asking the hard questions and providing insightful
comments during the preparation of this note. Thanks also go to Kristy Carroll and William and
Roberta Carroll for their patience and support.
1. Federal Election Commission Panel Discussion: Problems and Possibilities, 8 ADMIN. L.J. AM.
U. 223, 232 (1994) [hereinafter FEC Panel Discussion] (comments of Lawrence Noble, General
Counsel, Federal Election Commission).
2. See JOSEPH E. CANTOR, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., CRS ISSUE BRIEF: CAMPAIGN FINANCING
2 (1994) (stating that aggregate costs of House and Senate campaigns nearly sextupled between 1976
and 1992, while the cost of living roughly doubled during that period).
3. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1994). For the presidential campaign, there are two additional constraints:
the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9031-9042 (1994) (limiting
campaign expenditures during primary elections of presidential candidates who accept federal funds),
and the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9012 (1994) (limiting presidential
campaign expenditures and acceptance of most private contributions during general election for
presidential candidates who accept federal funds).
4. The First Amendment limits the ability of Congress to regulate campaign finance. Dollar
limitations on "independent expenditures" are prohibited because such limitations tend to exclude all
citizens and groups except candidates, political parties, and the press from "any significant use of the
most effective modes of communication." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1976) (per curiam).
Dollar limitations on campaign contributions are permissible because such limits place only a "marginal
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limits on who can contribute, how one can contribute, and how much one can
contribute.5 Congress passed the FECA in 1971 in response to scandal and
growing public cynicism about the influence that campaign contributions have
on the conduct of elected federal officials. The goal of the FECA is to reduce
public cynicism and bolster confidence in our elected representatives. This note
generally assumes that reducing public cynicism through regulation of cam-
paign finance is an achievable goal.
However laudable the goal, we may assume with near certainty that viola-
tions of the FECA will occur during the 1996 presidential and congressional
campaigns, if they have not already. 6 The question is, are we as a society
content with the number and severity of the violations likely to occur? Put
another way, given our choices for enforcing the FECA, have we chosen a
scheme of enforcement and punishment that will yield the optimal number of
FECA violations? This note argues that we have not. An application of the
principles for achieving optimal deterrence set out in recent scholarship sug-
gests that both the current level of sanctions for FECA violations and the
probability that these sanctions will be imposed are too low to provide optimal
deterrence against FECA violations. This note uses the term "optimal" in its
economic sense of weighing the cost of added enforcement ("the marginal
cost") against the benefit of added enforcement ("the marginal benefit"). Optimal
enforcement is the point at which the marginal cost equals the marginal benefit.
7
However, as with many economic formulations applied to law, optimality analysis
tends to disguise the normative component involved in assigning a value to the
marginal cost and the marginal benefit. This normative component becomes more
apparent when optimality analysis is applied to the enforcement of the FECA because
the marginal cost of enforcement, by and large, can be measured in dollars and cents,
whereas the value of the marginal benefit-increased public confidence in the elec-
toral process and in representative democracy-is particularly difficult to measure.
Part I of this note describes the enforcement scheme for the FECA, in which the
Federal Election Commission (FEC) has exclusive jurisdiction over civil FECA
violations and the Department of Justice has concurrent jurisdiction with the FEC
over criminal violations. Part 1 examines current scholarship on deterrence theory and
the proper scope of the civil and criminal law, and it describes the principles for
determining when civil or criminal sanctions will produce optimal deterrence. Part II
also analyzes the statutorily divided civil/criminal FECA enforcement scheme in light
restriction" on the contributor's ability to communicate freely. Id. The FECA does not cover so-called "soft
money" -contributions for "independent expenditures" and certain types of political party funds.
5. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a-441g (1994).
6. See infra text accompanying note Ill for the proposition that when an actor perceives the private
benefits of an action to outweigh the sanction for that action, she will take the action. See infra Part IIB
for the proposition that the private benefits of a FECA violation substantially outweigh the sanction in
most cases. Historical data also support the assertion. See infra note 104 (table detailing number of
Federal Election Commission enforcement actions for FECA violations).
7. To spend additional money on enforcement over the optimal level is inefficient because such
spending yields a benefit worth less than the cost of the additional enforcement.
[Vol. 84:551
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of the scholarship discussed. At first glance, the analysis suggests that increasing the
use of and threat of a criminal, nonmonetary sanction like imprisonment would
optimize deterrence for FECA violations. Further examination, however, reveals that
the use of the criminal sanction might be counterproductive.8 Thus, Part 11 argues that
the cost of FECA violations must be raised through increases in the magnitude of
monetary sanctions and increases in the probability that such sanctions will be
imposed. Part 11 suggests reforms to the FECA enforcement scheme, including,
among other things, a proposed statutory amendment to the FECA authorizing
enforcement through qui tam 9 actions.
I. THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN ACT
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA)' ° was enacted in 1972. Its
purpose is to reduce political corruption by eliminating the purchase of influ-
ence by campaign contributors." It codifies most of the federal laws covering
federal campaign financing and public reporting by campaign committees.'
2
With few exceptions, the FECA applies only to financial activity intended to
influence the nomination or election of candidates running for federal office. '
3
The FECA contains two functionally different types of provisions: campaign
financing statutes' 4 and campaign reporting statutes.' 5 Campaign financing
statutes regulate, limit, and, in some cases, prohibit financial transactions in
connection with the federal electoral process.' 6 Campaign reporting statutes
require that candidates and political committees publicly disclose the sources
and, in the case of committees, the recipients of their funds.' 7
Subsequent to its enactment in 1972, the FECA was amended in
1974,18 1976,' 9 and 1979.20 Prior to the 1976 amendments, all violations of the
8. See infra Part IIA2.
9. Qui tam is shorthand for qui tam pro domino rege, quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur ("Who
as well for the King as for himself sues in this matter"). 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *162
& n. 41 (W. Lewis ed., 1898) (cited in Marra v. Burgdorf Realtors, Inc., 726 F. Supp. 1000, 1012 (E.D.
Pa. 1989)). "The purpose of [a qui tam] action is to give citizens a right to bring civil suits to help in
the enforcement of the federal criminal law." Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of
Citizen Suits, "Injuries, "and Article 111, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 175 (1992).
10. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1994).
11. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1976) (per curiam); see also United States v. Goland, 977 F.2d
1359, 1359 (9th Cir. 1992) (Pregerson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), cert. denied,
507 U.S. 960 (1993).
12. PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OF-
FENSES 93 (6th ed. 1995) [hereinafter ELECTION LAW MANUAL (6th ed.)].
13. Id. at 93-94.
14. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a-441g, 442 (1994) (regulating campaign contributions and expenditures).
15. 2 U.S.C. §§ 432-437 (1994) (regulating reporting of campaign and convention financing).
16. ELECTION LAW MANUAL (6th ed.), supra note 12, at 94.
17. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-432, 434 (1994).
18. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1994)).
19. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475.
20. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339.
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Act were treated as misdemeanors. 21 There was no mens rea requirement; strict
criminal liability attached regardless of the motive, degree of criminal intent, or
amount of funds involved.22 Recognizing that First Amendment concerns are
present in nearly all FECA violations, courts interpreted the FECA as requiring
"general intent ' '23 to support a criminal conviction.24 The Department of
Justice then chose to limit enforcement of the FECA to cases in which the
defendants knew that their acts were illegal and the amount of money involved
in the case was more than "de minimus.
' 25
Congress substantially changed the enforcement landscape with the passage
of the 1976 FECA amendments.26 The 1976 amendments codified the civil/
criminal distinction for campaign finance violations. It created the Federal
Election Commission (FEC) and conferred on it exclusive jurisdiction for
enforcing civil 27 violations. 28 The FEC's power to sanction such violations is
limited to administrative conciliation and civil enforcement. 29 The Justice Depart-
ment prosecutes criminal FECA violations. Congress limited the imposition of
criminal sanctions for FECA violations to only "knowing and willful" viola-
tions in which relatively large sums of money are involved.3° Under the FECA,
criminal violations are misdemeanors, 31 but in most FECA prosecutions the
Justice Department uses other statutes to charge the conduct as a felony.
32
A. IMPLEMENTING THE CIVIL/CRIMINAL DISTINCTION: ENFORCEMENT OF FECA
OFFENSES
1. Investigations
The Department of Justice and the Federal Election Commission have signed
a Memorandum of Understanding to provide generally when and how potential
violations detected by one agency will be referred to the other. Because the
FECA separates enforcement jurisdiction along the civil/criminal divide, both
21. 2 U.S.C. § 441 (1972 Supp.), repealed by Pub. L. No. 94-283, sec. 112, 90 Stat. 475, 486 (1976);
see also ELECTION LAW MANUAL (6th ed.), supra note 12, at 107.
22. ELECTION LAW MANUAL (6th ed.), supra note 12, at 107.
23. General intent here rests on whether a reasonable person would have had knowledge of the
operable facts.
24. See, e.g., United States v. Finance Comm. to Re-Elect the President, 507 F.2d 1194, 1197-98
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (holding that when election committee knew that it had duty under FECA to report
contribution but failed to do so, it was guilty of violating the Act, and error, if any, in trial court's
application of scienter requirement was harmless).
25. PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF ELECTION OF-
FENSES 72 (5th ed. 1988) [hereinafter ELECTION LAW MANUAL (5th ed.)].
26. Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (1976).
27. That is, nonfeasant and quantitatively de minimus violations.
28. Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. at 482.
29. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(4)-(6) (1994).
30. Codified initially at 2 U.S.C. § 441j, this provision was moved to 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d) in 1979.
See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d) (1994).
31. Id. In 1979, Congress refined the FECA, Pub L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1979), reorganizing
some sections without major substantive change.
32. The Department's use of alternative prosecutorial theories is discussed infra notes 53-57 and
accompanying text.
[Vol. 84:551
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agencies have recognized that it is important to determine early in the investiga-
tive process which label should be attached to a matter.33
The FEC is given broader investigative power than the Department of Justice.
When, in the course of an investigation, the Department of Justice determines
that the criminal label is inappropriate, it must promptly refer the case to the
FEC.3 4 By contrast, the FEC may conduct a parallel administrative inquiry even
when there is an active criminal investigation involving the same matter.35
Courts, however, have rejected interpretations of the FECA that limit the Justice
Department's ability to initiate a criminal prosecution for a FECA violation
prior to or in the absence of an FEC referral.3 6
Under the Memorandum of Understanding, both agencies strive to cooperate
during the investigative stage. Statutory and procedural rules, however, prohibit
the sharing of some information between the two agencies. FEC employees are
specifically prohibited from sharing the product of their investigations with
anyone, including prosecutors or federal criminal investigators.37 During the
course of a criminal investigation, the Department of Justice will share informa-
tion with the FEC subject to certain legal restrictions.38
2. Criminal Prosecutions
Within the already limited scope for labelling a FECA violation "criminal,
' 39
the Department of Justice has further limited the scope of potential criminal
enforcement to those violations that are "significant and substantial." ' 40 The
factors that the Department considers in determining whether a violation is
"significant and substantial" are the dollar amount involved in the illegal
activity and the level of criminal intent involved in carrying out the activity.
41
This policy limits criminal prosecutions to certain situations. 42 The most com-
33. See Memorandum of Understanding between U.S. Dep't of Justice and Federal Election Comm'n
(1977), reprinted in ELECTION LAW MANUAL (6th ed.), supra note 12, at 120 [hereinafter Memorandum
of Understanding].
34. Id.
35. See 2 U.S.C. § 437d (1994).
36. See, e.g., United States v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 701, 638 F.2d 1161
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1077 (1980); United States v. Jackson, 433 F. Supp. 239 (W.D.N.Y.
1977), affd, 586 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 977 (1979); United States v. Tonry, 433 F.
Supp. 620 (E.D. La. 1977).
37. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(12) (1994).
38. See Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 33, at 121. In the course of a criminal
investigation, any information given before a grand jury cannot be shared with the Commission. Id.
(citing FED. R. CRIM. P. 6).
39. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d) (1994) (requiring knowing and willful violation).
40. Memorandum of Understanding, supra note 33, at 120-21. Factors that will affect the determina-
tion of referrals include the "repetitive nature of the acts, the existence of a practice or pattern, prior
notice, and the extent of the conduct in terms of geographic area, persons, and monetary amounts
among many other proper considerations." Id.
41. ELECTION LAW MANUAL (6th ed.), supra note 12, at 114.
42. When a prosecution results in a FECA conviction, the violator may be punished with a prison
sentence not to exceed one year and a fine the greater of $25,000 or three times the amount of the
1996]
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mon is cases in which a violator uses surreptitious means such as cash,
conduits, 43 or false documentation to conceal conduct that violates a substantive
FECA requirement, such as using conduits to conceal corporate funding of
political campaigns in violation of 2 U.S.C. § 441b.
The common practice of "bundling" contributions potentially provides an-
other example of conduct that the Department of Justice is likely to prosecute.
44
A bundler is typically a political action committee or political party committee
that has already given the maximum allowed for the committee under the
FECA. The committee requests that members send personal checks for the
candidate to the committee and then sends the bundled personal checks to the
candidate. 45 The practice has the appearance and the intended effect of circum-
venting the FECA's contribution limits and prohibitions. 46 The practice has been
challenged in court,4 7 but currently bundling is not illegal per se provided the
underlying contributions are within the FECA limits. A bundling scheme that
involves instructions to the contributors to avoid one of the other FECA
provisions, however, such as the requirement that contributors of more than
$200 identify their employer to the campaign committee, is illegal.48
Even when an offense fits within the limited scope set out by the Department
of Justice, four features of the FECA enforcement scheme make criminal
prosecutions under section 437g(d) difficult:
(1) it purports to reach only malum in se activity, but provides only misde-
meanor sanctions;
49
contribution or expenditure involved in the violation. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(1)(A). Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, punishment may be increased to a one-year prison sentence and a fine the
greatest of $100,000; three times the contribution or expenditure involved in the violation; or twice the
gross pecuniary gain or loss resulting from the offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 357 1(b), (d) (1994).
43. A conduit is a person who makes a contribution in her own name using funds supplied by
another. ELECTION LAW MANUAL (6th ed.), supra note 12, at 117.
44. " 'Bundling' is a term applied to the practice of collecting numerous contributions from
individuals to a particular federal candidate and then delivering these checks en masse to the candi-
date." Id. at 113.
45. FEC Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 245-46 (comments of Elizabeth Hedlund, Director, FEC
Watch, Center for Responsive Politics).
46. ELECTION LAW MANUAL (6th ed.), supra note 12, at 113-14.
47. The public interest group Common Cause challenged the practice of bundling, arguing that
bundled contributions should be counted against the bundler's contribution limits. See Common Cause
v. Federal Election Comm'n, 489 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1980). If the committee exercises "direction
and control" over the contributions, the contributions will be counted against the committee's limit. But
the FEC's attempt in a 1989 rulemaking to delineate situations in which direction and control exist was
held to be too imprecise to outweigh the burden the regulation placed on First Amendment associational
interests. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Republican Senatorial Comm., 966 F.2d 1471, 1477
(D.C. Cir. 1992). The practice is considered legal because there are no standards in place to define
"direction and control" such that enforcement actions might be taken against bundlers.
48. ELECTION LAW MANUAL (6th ed.), supra note 12, at 114.
49. Presumably, the difficulty here is that careerist concerns for prosecutors and allocation of
prosecutorial resources make securing a misdemeanor conviction an insufficient incentive for the effort
required in proving a malum in se activity.
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(2) it is governed by a special three-year statute of limitations, which often
expires before an investigation is complete;
(3) it is subject to complex and confusing venue rules; and
(4) it requires that a monetary jurisdictional floor be satisfied regardless of
the criminal culpability of potential defendants. 50
In response to the statutory obstacles to criminal FECA prosecutions, the
Department of Justice suggests that prosecutors seek alternative theories to
prosecute FECA offenses. 5' The use of alternative prosecutive theories for
prosecuting FECA offenses, however, is potentially problematic. Arguably,
Congress intended the ineffective criminal enforcement structure under the
FECA to be the exclusive method for prosecuting FECA violations. The courts,
though, have rejected this argument.52
There are three common alternative theories that may be used for prosecuting
criminal FECA violations as felonies. The first is the federal false statements
statute.53 This theory would be available in cases in which a violator disguises
an excessive contribution, through the use of conduits, for example, and thereby
willfully causes the recipient political committee to file a false report with the
FEC. The offense could be characterized as a false statement because the
violator has impeded the FEC from exercising its enforcement jurisdiction and
its public disclosure responsibilities. 54 Second, a criminal FECA violation could
be a conspiracy to defraud the United States.55 By causing political committees
to misrepresent the true source of campaign contributions, causing their illegal
nature to be concealed from the FEC, the violator has disrupted and impeded
the FEC from carrying out its statutory duties. Finally, when funds that cannot
be used as political contributions 56 are diverted for that purpose, the offense
could constitute embezzlement 5 7
Most criminal prosecutions for FECA violations are brought only when the
50. ELECTION LAW MANUAL (5th ed.), supra note 25, at 73-75.
51. See ELECTION LAW MANUAL (6th ed.), supra note 12, at 108-09 (discussing strategic advantages
of prosecuting campaign finance violations as felonies under Title 18).
52. See United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 565 (3d Cir. 1994). In Curran, the defendant argued
that because the FECA targets specific conduct, it supersedes the more general criminal provisions of
Title 18. The court conceded that the argument "has a certain logic and sense of fairness to it," but
found it to be "not persuasive and ... not supported by decisional law." Id.; see also United States v.
Hopkins, 916 F.2d 207, 219 (5th Cir. 1990) ("The offenses under Title 18 ... stand wholly apart and
separate from any violation of the federal election laws.").
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
54. ELECTION LAW MANUAL (5th ed.), supra note 25, at 76 (citing Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462
(1910)).
55. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994).
56. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (1994) (prohibiting banks, corporations, and labor organizations from
making direct political contributions).
57. ELECTION LAW MANUAL (5th ed.), supra note 25, at 76. For example, if the funds are from a
union treasury, the offense could be embezzlement under 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1988). If the funds are
improperly diverted bank funds, the offense could be embezzlement under 18 U.S.C. § 656 (1994).
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conduct can be charged under one of the three alternative felony theories, with a
FECA misdemeanor count included for good measure.58 Relatively few crimi-
nal FECA prosecutions have gone to trial, and relatively few criminal convic-
tions have been obtained through plea bargains, 59 however, thus reflecting the
difficulties in imposing a criminal sanction on campaign finance violators under
the alternative felony theories. The only two reported cases, United States v.
Goland6° and United States v. Curran,6' reflect the mixed reception that these
theories have received in court.
In Goland, the defendant engaged in a complicated scheme to support the
1986 senatorial campaign of Alan Cranston. To improve Senator Cranston's
odds in his close race with Republican challenger Ed Zschau, the defendant,
Goland, decided he could draw votes away from Zschau by scripting and
financing a televised political advertisement for the independent candidate in
the race, Ed Vallen.62 The tag line at the end of the advertisement read, "Paid
for by the Committee to Elect Ed Vallen to the U.S. Senate," instead of "Paid
for by Michael Goland," as required for an independent expenditure.63 To keep
the ad on the air, Goland collected checks from "contributors," whom Goland
reimbursed with cash, to give the appearance that the ad had been paid for by
Vallen's campaign committee. 64
At trial, the government charged Goland under the alternative theories of
conspiracy to defraud the United States and causing false statements to be
filed,65 as well as with a FECA violation.66 The jury rejected the felony counts
and convicted only on the FECA violation.67 The Ninth Circuit upheld the
conviction.68
The Ninth Circuit rejected Goland's argument that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury on how to consider the requisite specific intent for the FECA
violation. 69 The dissent, however, found the scope of "contribution" in sections
58. Telephone Interview with Craig C. Donsanto, Director, Election Crimes Branch, Public Integrity
Section, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Apr. 19, 1995) [hereinafter Donsanto Interview].
59. Since 1988, the Justice Department has obtained approximately 200 criminal convictions
through plea bargains. Id. In the vast majority of these cases, the indictments included felony counts
under the alternative theories. Id.
60. 959 F2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1992).
61. 20 F.3d 560 (3d Cir. 1994).
62. Goland, 959 F.2d at 1451. Goland had run a similar campaign against Senator Charles Percy of
Illinois in 1984. Id.
63. Id. (citing 11 C.F.R. § 110. l(a)(1)(iii) (1990)).
64. Id.
65. Id. For a description of how these theories would apply, see supra notes 53-57 and accompany-
ing text.
66. Goland, 959 F.2d at 1451. The FECA violation was making excessive contributions to a political
campaign in violation of 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a(a)(1)(A), 437g(d) (1994).
67. Goland, 959 F.2d at 1451.
68. Id. at 1452.
69. Goland objected to the district court's jury instruction: " '[V]iolations of regulations or civil
statutes without more are not crimes, and such violations if any occurred, are not necessarily violations
of criminal law .... [Y]ou may consider [violations of civil statutes] as you would any other evidence
[Vol. 84:551
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441a(a)(1)(A) and 437g(d) to be vague, arguing that because a criminal viola-
tion requires specific intent, and Goland's ultimate goal was to make an
"independent expenditure" on behalf of Senator Cranston, the funds he sup-
plied for the independent candidate's advertisement should not be illegal "contri-
butions." 70
Jury instructions on the requisite mens rea also constituted the central issue
for the court in Curran. In Curran, the defendant, a practicing attorney and
chief executive officer of an anthracite coal company, used his employees as
conduits in a number of federal elections in order to contribute in excess of the
$1000 limit on individual contributions per federal election.' Curran explained
to his employees that the candidates he supported would favor the interests of
the anthracite industry.72
At trial, the government successfully won a felony conviction on the alterna-
tive theories of causing campaign committees to file false statements73 and
conspiracy to defraud the United States.74 The Third Circuit vacated the convic-
tion and remanded because the jury had been erroneously instructed about the
degree of intent that the government had to prove.75 The court stated that the
government could not show a direct violation of 18 U.S.C. § 100176 because the
FECA imposed no duty on Curran to disclose his contributions to the FEC.7 7
The court determined that when reading section 2(b)7 8 together with section
1001 in the federal election law context, the government must prove that the
"defendant kn[ew] of the [campaign committee] treasurers' reporting obliga-
tions, that he attempted to frustrate those obligations, and that he knew his
conduct was unlawful." 
79
To reach this conclusion, the court relied on the Supreme Court's holding in
Ratzlaf v. United States.80 In Ratzlaf, the defendant was accused of structuring
in determining whether or not Mr. Goland had the required specific intent to violate the law charged in
this indictment.' "Id. at 1454.
70. Id. at 1455-56 (Pregerson, J., dissenting).
71. United States v. Curran, 20 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 1994).
72. Id. The candidates were both Republican and Democratic.
73. The jury convicted Curran on three counts under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(b) and 1001. Id.
74. The jury convicted the defendant on one count under 18 U.S.C. § 371. Id. at 571.
75. Id. at 569.
76. Section 1001 provides:
Whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United
States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device
a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or
makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false, fictitious
or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
77. Curran, 20 F.3d at 567.
78. Section 2(b) prohibits "willfully caus[ing] an act to be done which if directly performed by ...
another would be an offense against the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 2(b) (1994).
79. Curran, 20 F3d at 569.
80. 114 S. Ct. 655 (1994).
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cash bank deposits to evade regulations requiring banks to report amounts
deposited in excess of $10,000. The bank has a statutory duty to file a report,
but the statute also prohibits a customer from breaking a single transaction into
two or more segments to evade having reports filed. The Court rejected the
argument that wilfulness could be shown by the restructuring itself, comment-
ing that it was "unpersuaded ... that structuring is so obviously 'evil' or
inherently 'bad' that the 'willfulness' requirement is satisfied irrespective of the
defendant's knowledge of the illegality of structuring." 8'
The Curran court found three similarities to Ratzlaf: (1) both the FECA and
the currency reporting statute require a third party to disclose information to a
government agency; (2) the underlying conduct was not "obviously 'evil' or
inherently 'bad' " because there is "little difference between breaking a cash
transaction into segments of less than $10,000 and making a contribution in the
name of another; and (3) the underlying conduct in both cases "was made
illegal by a regulatory statute.",
82
In sum, the scope of criminal prosecution for FECA violations appears to be
quite narrow. The Justice Department has creatively developed alternative
theories to prosecute FECA violations, and the courts have found these theories
to be consistent with congressional intent.83 Nevertheless, in the two cases in
which these theories have been tested in court, the Justice Department has met
resistance. In Goland, the jury was not convinced by the government's proof as
to the felony counts, and in Curran, the court of appeals placed a heightened
requirement on the government's proof as to criminal intent. Thus, twenty years
after Congress added civil enforcement to the criminal enforcement scheme for
FECA violations, the primacy of civil enforcement is unquestionable.
3. Civil Enforcement
The Federal Election Commission conducts the majority of FECA enforce-
ment actions. An FEC enforcement proceeding, called a Matter Under Review
(MUR), is initiated either by a complaint filed with the FEC,84 usually by an
opposing candidate or political party, or by the FEC itself in the course of its
review of political committee reports.85 Once initiated, the Commission's Office
of General Counsel (OGC) evaluates the matter and provides a recommendation
to the six-member Commission indicating whether there is "reason to believe"
81. Id. at 662. In 1994, Congress reversed the Court's requirement in Ratzlaf that a defendant know
that her conduct was illegal and that her illegal conduct would cause the bank to fail in its reporting
obligations. Violent Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 103-322, sec. 330017, § 5324(a), 108 Stat. 1796,
2149 (1994) (amending 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)).
82. Curran, 20 F.3d at 569.
83. See supra note 52.
84. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(1) (1994). For the FEC to proceed on the basis of a complaint, the identity of
the complainant must be disclosed to the Commission. Id. After receipt of a complaint, the FEC notifies
person(s) alleged to have committed a violation and gives them an opportunity to explain in writing
why the FEC should not proceed. Id.
85. § 437g(a)(2).
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a violation has occurred or is about to occur. The Commission votes on the
OGC evaluation in closed session, and if four Commissioners concur with the
OGC finding, the Commission initiates an investigation.86
The Commission has broad investigative powers, including the authority to
take depositions,87 subpoena documents,88 compel submission of reports and
answers to questions, 89 and enforce these orders in a federal district court. 90
When an investigation is complete, the OGC makes its recommendation to the
Commission and serves notice on the person(s) under investigation. 9' The
respondent may only respond with a reply brief.92 The FEC then attempts to
reach a conciliation agreement through informal negotiation.93 A conciliation
attempt may not be made public absent written permission of the respondent
and the Commission.9 4 Once a negotiation is resolved, however, either by a
conciliation agreement or a determination that no violation occurred, the Com-
mission must make the result public.95
If a case is not resolved through conciliation, the Commission usually files
suit in a federal district court, seeking the statutory maximum penalty: the
greater of $5000 or 100% of the amount in violation.96 If the suit alleges a
knowing and willful violation, the court may impose a penalty the greater of
$10,000 or 200% of the amount in violation. 97 Most respondents have signifi-
cant incentives to enter into conciliation agreements, such as avoiding the costs
of litigation, the publicity of a trial, and the possibility that a court will impose a
penalty significantly higher than the Commission's conciliation offer.
98
Although the statutory description of the conciliation process makes it appear
to be a rapid process, critics have complained that in practice enforcement is too
slow.99 To respond to criticisms of slow enforcement and the potential irrel-
86. Id.




91. § 437g(a)(3). The OGC serves the respondent with a brief detailing the OGC's position on the
legal and factual issues of the case. Id.
92. Id.
93. § 437g(a)(4)(A)(i). As a result of the 1979 FECA amendment, the Commission began to use an
expedited procedure, preprobable cause conciliation, to reach early agreements with respondents. 11
C.F.R. § 111.18(d) (1991). Under the expedited procedure, the Commission offers the respondent a






98. At the end of 1994, the FEC only had 47 matters in litigation before federal district and appellate
courts. Federal Election Commission, Press Release, Commission's Enforcement Priority System Prov-
ing Effective After 20 Months in Operation (Dec. 30, 1994) [hereinafter Dec. 30, 1994 FEC Press
Release].
99. See, e.g., COMMON CAUSE, STALLED FROM THE START 52 (1981) (explaining that FEC's insistence
upon obtaining admission of wrongdoing slows conciliation process); Kenneth A. Gross, The Enforce-
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evance of the FEC,'00 in 1993 the Commission prioritized its caseload accord-
ing to factors that include whether there was a willful intent to violate the
FECA, the impact the violation had on an election, and the amount of money
involved.' 0 ' Although prioritization seems a logical step, given the politically
partisan posture of the Commissioners, establishing enforcement priorities was
not an easy task.1
0 2
Under the new priority system, FEC investigations focus on violations of the
$25,000 annual limitation on contributions by individuals, the prohibition on
contributions by foreign nationals, and the forty-eight-hour reporting rule.' 0 3 As
a result, the number of MURs has dropped, but the aggregate amount of
penalties assessed has increased significantly. '4
Civil sanctions, then, are the primary threat that a potential FECA violator
has to consider. For campaign contributions above the statutory maximum, the
cost of potential sanctions is tied to the amount illegally given. Even if detected,
the potential violator knows that she has some control over the likelihood that a
civil sanction will be imposed on her. She can engage the FEC in a lengthy
conciliation process, and if conditions are right, she can then choose to cooper-
ment of Campaign Finance Rules: A System in Search of Reform, 9 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 279, 286
(1991) (former Associate General Counsel, Federal Election Commission) (arguing that "many matters
are not resolved in a timely manner").
100. See Charles Babcock, Real Campaign Reform Will Give the Watchdog Agency New Teeth,
WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 1992, at A2 (describing FEC's history of ineffectiveness and offering suggestions
to remedy ineffectiveness).
101. FEC Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 258 (Professor Thomas 0. Sargentich citing Federal
Election Commission, Press Release (Dec. 13, 1994)).
102. "[Prioritization] is a good idea. But it is very hard. We really cannot do it because we have six
Commissioners with six different ideas of what is a priority." Federal Election Commission Authoriza-
tion for Fiscal Year 1993: Hearings on H.R. 4116 Before the Subcomm. on Elections of the House
Comm. on House Administration, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1992) (response of Vice Chairman of
Federal Election Commission); see also FEC Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 259-60 (comments of
Elizabeth Hedlund, Director of FEC Watch, Center for Responsive Politics) (suggesting that prioritiza-
tion allowed FEC's legal staff to develop enforcement criteria).
103. FEC Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 259-60.
104. Id. In 1994, civil penalties contained in 107 conciliation agreements totaled $1,692,854. This
total includes the largest penalty assessed in the FEC's history: $550,000 against Prudential Securities,
Inc.










Dec. 30, 1994 FEC Press Release, supra note 98.
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ate no further, forcing the FEC either to prove its case de novo in a federal
district court or drop the case.
One might think that an enforcement scheme is not particularly effective
when it is very unlikely that a criminal sanction will be applied to a violator and
when a violator has considerable leverage over the agency that might apply a
civil sanction. But before we endorse this intuition, it is useful to examine
whether allocating additional resources to FECA enforcement would provide
greater deterrence to potential FECA violators. To that end, Part II describes
the principles of optimal deterrence developed in recent scholarship and then
applies these principles to the FECA enforcement scheme.
II. DETERRENCE THEORY AND THE FECA ENFORCEMENT SCHEME
A. THE PRINCIPLES FOR DETERMINING OPTIMAL SANCTIONS
This Part considers the principles for determining optimal sanctions and
applies those principles to FECA enforcement. Much of the scholarship devoted
to deterrence and the role of the criminal law begins with a description of the
historically paradigmatic spheres of civil and criminal law, and it usually
emphasizes that a civil remedy is imposed to compensate while a criminal
remedy is imposed to punish. 0 5 A utilitarian view of these paradigms recog-
nizes that both are forms of social control, in which the remedy imposes a
"cost" on the actors. The difference is in the nature of the cost imposed.
In general terms, the cost is calculated by the "amount" of the sanction
discounted by the likelihood that it will be imposed.' 0 6 The view that both the
civil and criminal law are engaged in social control through the imposition of
costs led law-and-economics scholars to an inquiry about what the "optimal"
costs ought to be to achieve the desired level of social control. 0 7 From this
perspective, the challenge has been to articulate a theory that explains the
existence of criminal and civil sanctions, the appropriate mix between them, and
the principles for their use.
Approaching the distribution of sanctions from a deterrence-only perspective
can be problematic, particularly when the sanctions are criminal. For purposes
of this discussion, however, a focus on deterrence is appropriate because the
express goal of the FECA is to increase public confidence in the federal
electoral process by deterring certain forms of direct and indirect financial
expenditures in support of federal elections.
Because deterrence helps achieve the goal of the FECA, the question arises
how that deterrence can be achieved most efficiently. Recent law-and-
105. See, e.g., Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and
Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1796 (1992).
106. Id. at 1845.
107. Id. at 1846.
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economics scholarship offers a two-step analysis for answering that question.
The first step is to choose the optimal amount of deterrence sought. The optimal
level of deterrence is the point at which the cost of additional enforcement
equals the benefit produced by that added enforcement. 118 The second step of
the analysis is to choose the type of sanction, the magnitude of the sanction, and
the rate of imposition of the sanction that will produce the optimal level of
deterrence.
Three factors help to determine the optimal amount of deterrence:' 0 9 (1) the
private benefits a violator will derive from the violation; (2) the probability that
an act will be a violation and that it will cause harm; and (3) the magnitude of
the harm." 0 The incentive to deter depends on the magnitude of the harm to the
public, making it an essential factor in determining the optimal level of deter-
rence. The private benefits enjoyed by violators also influence the optimal level
of deterrence because the greater the private benefits, the greater the potential
sanction required to achieve a certain level of deterrence. "'
There are two sets of choices involved in producing the optimal deterrence
level: the choice of the appropriate mix of the sanction's magnitude and its
probability of imposition and the choice between using monetary and nonmon-
etary sanctions. The magnitude/probability choice is based on an assumption
that potential violators are risk-neutral. When this assumption is made, the
relationship between the magnitude of the sanction and the probability of
imposition is inversely proportional. 112
The optimal magnitude/probability mix depends on whether the cost savings
from a high-penalty-low-enforcement scheme are greater than the savings
produced by a low-penalty-high-enforcement scheme. On the surface, it would
appear that a high-penalty-low-enforcement scheme would be preferable be-
cause it would produce equivalent deterrence but would be less costly to
maintain than a low-penalty-high-enforcement scheme. 1 3 This option causes
108. See supra note 7 (explaining why this is so).
109. See Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a
Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1232, 1236-37 (1985) (examining five factors to determine whether
monetary sanctions can adequately deter undesirable acts).
110. Id.
111. See supra note 7.
112. For example, a sanction of 500 units with a 20% chance of imposition will produce an amount
of deterrence equivalent to a sanction of 1000 units with a 10% chance of imposition. If the pool of
potential violators is not risk-neutral, however, these sanctioning options will not be equivalent. For
risk-averse individuals, the second option will produce more deterrence than the first because risk-
averse actors will overestimate the probability of imposition. Conversely, for risk-preferring individu-
als, the first option will produce more deterrence because risk-preferrers will underestimate the
probability of imposition.
113. This is because the cost of supporting the enforcement scheme necessary to impose sanctions
can be held down. The threat of a sanction being imposed causes the deterrence. Provided that the
probability of imposition is sufficient to make the threat credible, society deters certain violations
without maintaining 100% enforcement. The credibility of the threat varies with the potential violator's
attitude toward risk. Risk-averse individuals exaggerate the threat of sanction and are overdeterred
while risk-preferring individuals underestimate the threat of the sanction and are underdeterred. See
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greater losses in marginal deterrence, 1 4 however, which, if taken too far, could
result in loss of the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the sanction. 115
Because the probability-of-imposition variable in the deterrence formula is
measured by the perceptions of potential violators, if they know nullification
will be the likely result of judicial enforcement, that knowledge will reduce the
threat of and the deterrence value of the high-penalty-low-enforcement scheme.
One approach that might reduce this effect would be to disguise nullification
through "acoustic separation," which distinguishes "conduct rules" (it is wrong
to steal) from "decision rules" (but in this case the theft is excused or the act
was not actually theft because ... ).116 It is unclear, however, that nullification
can be successfully disguised. 1 7 In addition, consciously pursuing acoustic
separation to optimize a high-penalty-low-enforcement scheme raises moral
concerns that might also indicate the disutility of this strategy." 18 Thus, an
extreme high-penalty-low-enforcement scheme is likely to produce suboptimal
deterrence. The other extreme, low-penalty-high-enforcement, might not be
feasible because it would be impossible to gather information to detect suffi-
cient violations. Alternatively, it would be feasible, but not cost-effective, to
invest in a high rate of enforcement because enforcement costs would be greater
than the costs imposed if no violations were punished. There also are additional
costs at either extreme." 9 Therefore, an intermediate magnitude/probability
choice will produce optimal deterrence. The intermediate mix chosen will be
Louis M. Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the Problem of Crime
Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 326 & n.27 (1984).
114. Marginal deterrence is the amount of deterrence related to the marginal increases in the
magnitude of the fine. Marginal deterrence decreases as fines increase because each dollar taken from
the violator is not equivalent; that is, the risk of losing the first dollar is more damaging and produces
more deterrence than the risk of losing the last.
115. Nullification is likely to occur when the rate of enforcement drops to the point at which the
selection of those for enforcement actions appears arbitrary and when the magnitude of the sanction is
popularly considered to be out of proportion with the underlying conduct. See Seidman, supra note 113,
at 332 (arguing that in situations in which the utilitarian model requires very harsh penalties that seem
unjust, result would almost certainly be nullification).
116. See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal
Law, 97 HRv. L. REv. 625, 630 (1984); see also Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of
Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 729, 731 (1990) (explaining that rules of conduct give population ex
ante direction about what they may and may not lawfully do and principles of adjudication give
decisionmakers guidance in assessing ex post blameworthiness of individual's violation).
117. The analysis depends on potential violators measuring the threat of imposition by what society
says through its conduct rules rather than by what society does through its decision rules. Actions are
generally considered to speak louder than words, and, news coverage being what it is, reverberations
from the application of decision rules when the number of enforcement actions is low enough to appear
arbitrary and the sanction is high enough to appear cruel are likely to drown out what is said in the rules
of conduct.
118. See Seidman, supra note 113, at 326 n.30 (arguing that giving government officials power to
impose secret decision rules may not satisfy utilitarian criteria).
119. In either world-the one with draconian penalties for minor offenses or the one with a cop on
every comer and Big Brother in the house-psychic costs are imposed by "creating an environment in
which all are safe but none is free." HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 65
(1968).
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influenced by the second sanctioning decision, the choice between monetary
and nonmonetary sanctions.
1. The Preference for Monetary Sanctions
Deterrence theory assumes that monetary and nonmonetary sanctions can
produce equivalent deterrence.' 20 Deterrence theorists, however, suggest that
monetary sanctions have greater deterrence value than nonmonetary sanctions.
According to deterrence theory, the general ranking of the deterrence value for
sanctions from greatest to least is: (1) monetary sanctions only; (2) monetary
sanctions combined with nonmonetary sanctions; and (3) nonmonetary sanc-
tions only. 2 Deterrence theorists justify this ranking because generally enforce-
ment costs for monetary sanctions are lower. Procedures for imposing a monetary
sanction are less expensive, particularly when an administrative agency imposes
it, and the revenues gained from the sanction either directly or indirectly offset
the expenditures of enforcement.122 A monetary sanction alone will produce
optimal deterrence when probable violators have sufficient available assets to be
deterred by the magnitude of the sanction. Therefore, nonmonetary sanctions
should be applied only when a monetary sanction alone cannot adequately deter
violations. 123
The preference for monetary sanctions will affect the magnitude/probability
choice. Within the intermediate range of enforcement level set out above, a
"cheaper" high-penalty-low-enforcement scheme conflicts with the preference
for monetary sanctions because the pool of violators deterrable by a high
monetary sanction is smaller than that deterrable by the low-penalty-high-
enforcement scheme. The "collectability boundary" for high monetary sanc-
tions imposes a second limit on the high-penalty-low-enforcement scheme.
124
Thus, the optimal magnitude/probability mix will depend on whether the cost
savings from the high-penalty-low-enforcement scheme are greater than the
savings produced by the broader scope for monetary sanctions with a low-penalty-
high-enforcement scheme.
120. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 409,413-15 (1980).
121. See id. at 413-15, and Shavell, supra note 109, at 1236-37, for the proposition that a monetary
sanction should be used whenever it produces deterrence equivalent to a nonmonetary sanction.
122. See Shavell, supra note 109, at 1236; see also Posner, supra note 120, at 410 (arguing that
fines, unlike prison sentences, "show up on the benefit side of the social ledger").
123. See Shavell, supra note 109, at 1236 & n.16 (citing Becker, Bentham, and Montesquieu as
supporting choice of least costly sanction available); see also Posner, supra note 120, at 413 (arguing
that "fines are preferable to imprisonment where the fines are collectable").
124. The "collectibility boundary" exists because wealthy violators can "hide assets, divert ex-
pected income, overstate expenses or hire superior legal talent to resist collection efforts." John C.
Coffee, Jr., Corporate Crime and Punishment: A Non-Chicago View of the Economics of Criminal
Sanctions, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 419, 437 (1980) [hereinafter Coffee, Corporate Crime and Punish-
ment]. The result is that the deterrent effect of a monetary sanction is reduced such that the legal threat
only extends to the collectibility boundary. Id.
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2. An Exception: Blameworthy Conduct and the Criminal Sanction
Although normally the deterrence analysis favors monetary sanctions, such is
not the case when society desires morally to blame the violator through a
criminal sanction. Because satisfying this societal desire to blame has value, a
deterrence-only approach to blameworthy conduct-that is, monetary sanctions
only-would not produce the most social utility.' 25 Instead, when both society
and the community of potential violators consider the conduct being regulated
blameworthy, use of the nonmonetary sanction of blame/stigma as well as the
monetary sanction will provide optimal deterrence. 1
26
When an actor considers conduct to be blameworthy, society obtains some
deterrence at no cost. For example, imagine that Sheila is alone in a room in
which someone has left behind a wallet, and protruding from the wallet is a
one-hundred-dollar bill. Sheila has not eaten in two days and could put the
money to immediate use. Assume that Sheila is risk-neutral and that she is
100% confident that she could take the money without being caught. Assume
further that she is 100% confident that at no time in the future will she feel
compelled to reveal her theft or that her theft will be discovered. Thus, there are
no external threats present to deter Sheila from taking the money. Nevertheless,
Sheila may be deterred from taking the money because she has internalized a
moral code that would label the taking of the money as blameworthy. It would
offend her pride, her conscience, and her self-conception to steal the money.
Society has obtained an increment of deterrence without investing the resources
to make Sheila perceive the threat of an external sanction present in that
situation.
Because society can obtain this kind of incremental deterrence at no cost
beyond the initial investment in teaching Sheila that theft is blameworthy, it
would make sense to criminalize-that is to label as blameworthy-all of the
conduct that society seeks to deter. A common response to this line of thought is
that such an expansive use of blaming through the criminal law produces
overdeterrence unless the definition of the blameworthy conduct is restricted to
125. A deterrence-only rationale does not always motivate the distribution of criminal sanctions. In
settings in which society considers the conduct blameworthy or factors are present that mitigate
blameworthiness, to adopt a single-purpose distributive principle for sanctions, such as deterrence,
would "justify consideration of factors that, in the Anglo-American ... tradition, are considered
illegitimate bases for distributing ... liability." Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principals [sic] for the
Distribution of Criminal Sanctions, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 19, 22 & n.15 (1987). Nevertheless, some
scholars have argued that use of the criminal sanction is nonetheless consistent with a deterrence-only
rationale. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193,
1214 (1985) (arguing that substantive doctrines of criminal law can be given economic meaning and
can be shown to promote efficiency); Shavell, supra note 109, at 1247-59 (arguing that optimal
deterrence plays important part in explaining criminal law).
126. "Control through moral inhibitions will often impose a smaller social cost per unit of
prevention. If people can be persuaded to abstain from some crime even when criminal conduct is in
their self-interest, we can avoid the social cost of structuring incentives that discourage crime."
Seidman, supra note 113, at 335.
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conduct for which the "optimal" amount is zero. 1
27
This response, however, does not fully comprehend the issue. 28 What limits
the utility of expanding the criminal sanction is a paradox: blaming remains
effective only when those blamed consider blame to be motivated by a nonconse-
quentialist morality. 129 Thus, it is not possible to "set out deliberately to change
the way people blame so as to maximize utility." 1 30 Imagine that Sheila is told
by criminal statute that driving above the speed limit is morally blameworthy
conduct.1 3' Imagine further that Sheila perceives that the only reason society
has criminalized speeding is to make enforcement less expensive by causing
people to internalize the belief that speeding is blameworthy rather than because
speeding violates a set of norms composed of values other than maximizing
efficiency. Sheila, then, is unlikely to internalize the belief that speeding is
blameworthy because society has offered no reason for why speeding is inher-
ently wrong other than that if she chooses to believe that speeding is wrong,
society will save money. If Sheila does not internalize the belief that speeding is
morally wrong, then she can only be deterred from speeding by the threat of an
external sanction. Society will have failed to achieve its objective by criminaliz-
ing speeding. As a result, this exception to the preference for civil monetary
penalties should apply only when the social desire to blame already exists;
blame is ineffective if extended only to optimize deterrence.
But if the content of blameworthy conduct cannot be consciously changed for
utilitarian purposes, it is nonetheless true that as society develops and changes,
the content of blameworthy conduct changes. Some scholars accept the adver-
127. The view relies on a distinction between "pricing" conduct and "sanctioning" conduct. Blame
should not be used to deter "priced" conduct because some level of the activity is desirable, but actors
should be made to internalize the costs of their actions. Blame is appropriate to "sanction" conduct
when, assuming zero enforcement costs, the socially desired amount of the activity would be zero. See
John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models--and What
Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1876-77 & nn.5-7 [hereinafter Coffee, Paradigms Lost]
(distinguishing between civil penalties used to "price" misconduct when regulated activity has positive
social utility but imposes externalities on others, and criminal law used to "sanction" conduct that
society believes lacks any social utility).
128. First, those who espouse this view recognize that for the optimal amount of the action to be
zero, the actors' utility must be disregarded. But they offer no satisfactory explanation for why this
should be. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-
Shaping Policy, 1990 DuKE L.J. 1, 12 (relying on anecdotal observations that people are shocked by
idea of recognizing criminal benefits); Shavell, supra note 109, at 1234 (assuming away benefits to
criminal). The reasoning is circular; crimes are those activities for which society disregards the
criminal's utility, and we can disregard the criminal's utility because the regulated conduct is a crime.
Second, the price/sanction distinction relies on an assumption of zero enforcement costs. Because
this assumption is purely theoretical, we still must decide how much deterrence we want to buy whether
the conduct is priced or sanctioned.
129. Seidman, supra note 113, at 340.
130. Id.
131. Although speeding currently is punishable by a monetary fine as a criminal misdemeanor, I
assert that the vast majority of Americans would not consider a person driving 60 miles per hour in a 55-
mile-per-hour zone to be morally blameworthy. Thus, the sanction is monetary only because those
caught for speeding are not stigmatized.
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tised deontological rationale for blaming and ascribe these changes to society's
"moral" decisions, which are outside the purview of designing optimal sanc-
tions for enforcing these moral choices. 32 Others have suggested methods for
recognizing new blameworthy conduct. 133 These views presume that assigning
blame through the criminal law is appropriate when there is social consensus
that the conduct is blameworthy. These views recognize that social consensus
about blameworthy conduct is expressed through the political process, but they
appear to regard the goal of the process to be the attainment of a consensus
about how shared deontological norms should be applied to specific conduct.
A more persuasive view is that the political process of criminalizing conduct
is a struggle over cost allocation, in which the result is announced with
declarations of blameworthiness. 34 Regulation of conduct is sought when
mutually incompatible activities come into conflict. 135 It often is possible to
resolve the conflict to the same degree whether the cost is assigned to incompat-
ible activity A or B. 13 6 The groups that dominate the political process therefore
are not simply concerned with the total cost of crime, but also with how that
cost is distributed. Acting in their perceived self-interest, these groups will
exercise their influence to shift the costs away from the activities in which they
engage and onto the incompatible activities of others. 37 This distribution is
132. Dau-Schmidt argues:
[S]ociety will make an activity a crime whenever the social benefits of changing individual
preferences through criminal punishment outweigh the social costs. However, since this
weighing ... is conducted through a political process on the basis of ethical and moral
standards, ... I conclude that other disciplines can usefully inform the economic model of
criminal law.
Dau-Schmidt, supra note 128, at 3. Similarly, Alvin Klevorick maintains:
What moral judgments of the society make some acts criminal? These are the questions that
... economic analysis... [does not have] a comparative advantage in answering ....
The law-and-economics explanation of the criminal sanction presupposes the existence of a
transaction structure.
Alvin K. Klevorick, Legal Theory and the Economic Analysis of Torts and Crimes, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
905, 908 (1985).
133. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 200 [hereinafter Coffee, Does "Unlaw-
ful" Mean "Criminal"] (citing criminalization of "white collar" offenses such as price-fixing, tax
fraud, and securities fraud as examples). The argument suggests that to restrict the criminal law to its
proper sphere of regulating blameworthy conduct, new criminal offenses should be limited to formerly
civil norms that have "hardened" within the industry or professional community such that the
violations have become recognized as "blameworthy." Id. at 201.
134. Seidman, supra note 113, at 346.
135. For example, a car stereo can only be in one car at any one time whether the car be that of the
purchaser of the stereo or that of the person who took the stereo from the purchaser.
136. Car stereo thefts can be equally deterred by penalizing the purchaser of the stereo, who will
then have greater incentive to invest in private prevention, or penalizing the taker of the stereo.
137. See Seidman, supra note 113, at 343-44 (arguing that even in situations in which victims are
least cost avoiders, our political institutions could not be persuaded to tell potential victims of crime
that they must cower so that criminals can avoid cost of punishment). But see generally Omri
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justified by a "free will" theory that those who engage in the losing incompat-
ible activity choose to do so and are worthy of blame. 1
38
The efficacy of using blaming as a deterrent depends on the cooperation of
the condemned; those likely to be punished must believe the rhetoric of blame
and accept the legitimacy of punishment. 139 The recent trend toward extending
the criminal law to conduct not considered blameworthy has led to concerns
about overcriminalization.140 Thus, when the criminal sanction is used to punish
conduct that is not considered blameworthy, the deterrent effect of stigma will
not be present and the criminal sanction will produce suboptimal deterrence.
In sum, a monetary sanction should be used whenever it will produce
equivalent deterrence to a nonmonetary sanction. Whether a monetary sanction
can produce equivalent deterrence will depend on whether the probable viola-
tors have sufficient available assets to be deterred by the magnitude of the
monetary sanction. The magnitude of a sanction can be adjusted in inverse
proportion to the probability that a sanction will be imposed to produce equiva-
lent deterrence for risk-neutral actors. For risk-preferring actors, a low-penalty-
high-enforcement scheme is likely to produce more deterrence as the risk of
imposition approaches certainty of imposition. A low-penalty-high-enforcement
scheme also allows for greater use of monetary sanctions because the pool of
deterrable violators will be greater. Therefore, a low-penalty-high-enforcement
scheme is preferable unless the cost savings from a high-penalty-low-
enforcement scheme are greater than the losses caused by the smaller effective
scope for monetary sanctions.
While monetary sanctions are preferable, there are two limits on their use.
One is pragmatic. If the costs of enforcement, such as information costs to
detect and sanction violations, are high, then the low-penalty-high-enforcement
option may not be available. This will restrict the use of monetary sanctions to
the smaller pool for which the optimal level of deterrence is produced by a
high-penalty-low-enforcement scheme.
A second limitation arises when the underlying conduct is considered blame-
worthy. For blameworthy conduct, a criminal sanction might be preferable. The
reasons may be expressed under a deterrence rationale or a retributivist ratio-
nale. The deterrence rationale is either that a monetary sanction does not
Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for Private Precautions Against
Crime, II J.L. ECON. & ORG. 434 (1995) (offering model to align private incentives for crime prevention
with public incentives for criminal law enforcement).
138. Id. at 343.
139. Id. at 347; see also PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LIABILITY & BLAME:
COMMUNITY VIEWS AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 201 (1995) (providing empirical research to support
proposition that "discrepancies between the criminal code and the community tend to undercut the
condemnation of conviction and thereby lessen the effectiveness of condemnation as a deterrent
threat").
140. See Coffee, Does "Unlawful"Mean "Criminal," supra note 133, at 197-98 (defining overcrimi-
nalization to be when criminal law departs from basic method of "advance legislative specification of
the conduct proscribed ... an emphasis on the defendant's state of mind ... and a close linkage
between the criminal law and behavior deemed morally culpable by the general community").
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produce equivalent deterrence or that the assumption that a monetary sanction is
less costly to impose does not hold true for blameworthy conduct, because the
act of blaming through sanctioning produces a sense of moral wrong that is
internalized throughout the community. When this sense of morality has been
internalized, it acts as a deterrent even when the magnitude of the sanction and
the probability of imposition on their own would not. Thus, for blameworthy
conduct when the probable violator and the community in which she lives have
internalized the dominant moral code, a nonmonetary, criminal sanction will be
more efficient than a monetary sanction at producing the optimal level of
deterrence.
The scope of conduct that meets this definition is limited. The process of
assigning blame, while making reference to deontological norms, appears to be
a process of assigning costs through the political process and then announcing
the result in the language of morality. As political minorities, the communities
on the receiving end of this assignment of blame will in many cases refuse to
internalize the blame that has been assigned to them. In those cases, use of the
criminal, nonmonetary sanction will be less efficient, because the internal
deterrence will not be present. Conversely, conduct that the general populace
considers blameworthy may not get treated as blameworthy in the political
process because the interests that dominate that process do not share the views
of the general populace on that issue.
B. OPTIMAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE FECA
This Section will apply the principles of deterrence theory outlined above to
assess whether the FECA is underenforced. This assessment reveals that current
enforcement of the FECA is suboptimal. One of the underlying premises of the
FECA is that deterring certain direct and indirect financial expenditures in
support of federal elections will reduce public cynicism and increase public
confidence in the electoral process and in representative democracy. 141 Assum-
ing that this relation exists, an application of optimality analysis considers the
marginal cost of increased deterrence compared to the marginal benefit of
reduced cynicism and increased public confidence.
The current level of deterrence for FECA violations appears to be quite low.
Twenty-four years of FECA enforcement has done little to reduce public
cynicism. 142 Perhaps factors outside FECA enforcement are responsible for this
trend, but if regulation of campaign finance was thought to be a means to reduce
public cynicism, an assessment of the benefits gained by FECA violations, the
harm caused by FECA violations, the probability that a violation will be
sanctioned, and the magnitude of the sanction if it is imposed indicates that
potential violators have much to gain and little to lose by violating the law. A
141. See cases cited supra note 11.
142. See generally Marty Jezer & Ellen Miller, Money Politics: Campaign Finance and the
Subversion of American Democracy, 8 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 467 (1994).
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number of low-cost options presented in Part III are available to the government
to increase deterrence for FECA violations. As difficult as it may be to deter-
mine precisely the optimal level of deterrence for FECA violations,,4 3 this note
argues that adoption of these options will optimize FECA enforcement because,
by the terms of the FECA itself, deterring FECA violations in order to increase
public confidence in the electoral process is an important social benefit. At the
current level of FECA deterrence, there has been no increase in public confi-
dence. Therefore, to reap any of the social benefits of increased public confi-
dence, FECA deterrence must be increased."44
To analyze the optimality of FECA enforcement, it is necessary to attempt to
define the private benefits enjoyed by FECA violators, the harm caused by
FECA violations, the magnitude of current sanctions, and the probability that
sanctions will be imposed. 145 While most of these definitions will necessarily be
somewhat imprecise, because of the difficulties in obtaining any exact mea-
sures, it appears that the scheme of sanctions and enforcement is suboptimal.
The timing of violations and punishment is a peculiarly important variable in
the FECA context. The deterrent effect on a campaign of all but felony
sanctions is discounted because sanctions are imposed after an election, thereby
skewing the time value of money. For example, the value of $10,000 two weeks
before an election might make the crucial difference in the outcome. If it does,
that $10,000 "investment" in a candidate would likely be worth far more to the
contributor than a $20,000 civil penalty assessed after the election. Similarly,
the negative publicity of pre-election enforcement is a significant deterrent
regardless of the magnitude of the sanctions. 1
46
1. Private Benefits
The private benefit to a contributor 147 of any campaign contribution, legal or
illegal, is difficult to measure. The benefit that flows to the campaign contributor
could be either the benefit that the candidate who shares her views is more
likely to win an election or, as is more common, that the increased chance of
winning means that there is an increased chance that the contributor will
143. The difficulty arises because the costs are measured in dollars and cents while the benefits are
largely intangible. Nevertheless, the time and effort spent by Congress in passing the FECA and
funding the FEC indicate a fairly substantial value placed on marginal increases in public confidence.
144. This assertion is based on an assumption that other factors influencing public confidence are
held constant.
145. The use of felony prosecutions by the Justice Department is integrated into this analysis. Not
only do the provisions of the FECA itself provide for suboptimal enforcement, but even attempts to
supplement enforcement through alternative means yield suboptimal enforcement.
146. I have anecdotal evidence to this effect, but my source would prefer to remain unnamed.
Negative publicity not only hurts the campaign in the instant race, but it also impairs future fundraising
because contributors are wary of having their names associated with campaigns that have been the
subject of negative publicity.
147. For simplicity's sake, I used "contributor" to stand both for individual contributors and
political action committees (PACs). As to PACs, I will limit the assessment of the benefit and harm to
the PAC as a corporate entity, though additional benefits may flow to the PAC's individual supporters.
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materially benefit from legislation supported by that candidate. 148 If a contribu-
tor contributes to both main candidates in an election, the benefit from the
contributions will not be in helping either candidate to win, assuming propor-
tional effects of contribution, but in being counted among the winner's support-
ers and gaining whatever legislative benefits may flow from that status. 1
49
In an individual contest, the private benefit is likely to be greatest when a
candidate, if elected, would be in a position to confer discrete legislative
benefits on the illegal contributor. If, for instance, the contributor sought a
particular subsidy or allocation that could be attached by the candidate as a rider
to legislation, then that contributor would have a large incentive to violate the
campaign finance law.
Absent a situation in which the contributor essentially seeks a quid pro quo,
the benefit of any contribution in particular elections might be quite limited. In
this analysis, the relevant benefit is the marginal benefit derived from the illegal
contribution. 150 The marginal benefit of an illegal contribution depends on the
context in which it is made: it may either be a benefit that arises when the
outcome of an election is in doubt and the contributor has reason to prefer one
candidate over the others (an "intercandidate" benefit) or a benefit that arises
when the outcome of the election is nearly certain but the contributor is
competing with others to influence the candidate's position on certain issues (an
"intracandidate" benefit). In a hotly contested race, sophisticated and well-
endowed contributors may seek to reap both intercandidate and intracandidate
benefits by contributing to more than one candidate, with a greater contribution
going to the most favored candidate. For a material benefit to flow from the
illegal contribution, then, it first must have an impact on the candidate's chances
of winning and her actions if she does win. Even if the illegal contribution
might have an impact, it could be offset either by an illegal contribution to the
opposing candidate or from the contributor's opponent's contribution to the
same candidate. Moreover, if the contribution had an impact and the candidate
won, that impact must also cause her to take positions that she would not
already have taken absent the contribution. If she takes that position, it has to
have an effect the contributor desires on legislation that gets enacted.
But if this were the only possible benefit from campaign contributions, it
would not make sense for anyone but the person seeking a quid pro quo to
148. This is true, provided the benefit has not been offset by donations from the contributor's
opponents.
149. Profiles of legal contributions indicate that contributors tend to target candidates in the best
position, usually by committee assignment, to aid them. See LARRY MAKINSON & JOSHUA GOLDSTEIN,
CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE PoLITIcs, OPEN SECRETS: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONGRESSIONAL MONEY AND
POLITICS 36 (1992) ("One of the first patterns that becomes apparent when reviewing the political
contributions to incumbents in Congress is that the member's profile of contributors tends to parallel his
or her committee assignments.").
150. An illegal contribution may be made in cash or in kind. Thus, an illegal contribution not only
would be a $5000 contribution made by an individual, but also could be a fundraising event held on
corporate premises, supplied by corporate resources, for which the corporation is never reimbursed.
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contribute. There are, however, two other important considerations when measur-
ing the private benefit in particular elections. First, as federal elections become
increasingly expensive, potential contributors may have a special incentive to
violate the law because the benefit from legal contributions may be nil, as they
are too small to make a difference. If that is the case, a potential contributor will
have an incentive to make only illegal contributions. Then only illegal contribu-
tors receive a benefit from their contributions, though that benefit may still be
rather small.
Second, even when the outcome of the election is not in doubt, illegal
contributions might still benefit illegal contributors vis-A-vis other contributors.
In theory, contributors should not benefit when the candidate does not need the
contribution to win.' 15  Until recently, however, that contribution was at the
candidate's disposal for even personal use, 152 and by putting these funds at the
candidate's disposal, the contributor could receive special legislative benefits
from the candidate. Despite the recent ban on personal use of surplus campaign
funds, however, a candidate still enjoys benefits from surplus funds such that
she might be inclined to confer a benefit on the contributor.
Most important, even if the magnitude of the benefit in particular elections is
not that great, when the contributor has substantial wealth and a legislative
agenda, the marginal benefits from individual illegal contributions can be
aggregated. This ability to aggregate the benefits from illegal contributions
provides a special incentive for wealthy contributors to make illegal contribu-
tions. 153 When the benefits are aggregated, the seemingly remote chance that an
illegal contribution may result in some form of legislation increases dramati-
cally. 154 In addition, alliances can be formed between groups of contributors
151. If one accepts a relation between campaign contributions and influence, there is no reason for
the candidate to "sell" influence to contributors if the candidate is certain to win.
152. The uses for surplus federal campaign funds are regulated by 2 U.S.C. § 439a (1994). In 1980,
Congress amended § 439a to prohibit new Members from using surplus funds for personal use. Pub. L.
No. 96-197, sec 113, § 313, 93 Stat. 1339, 1366 (1980). Because of a grandfather clause, this provision
only became applicable to the rest of the Congress in January 1993. Pub. L. No. 101-194, sec. 504(a),
§ 313(b), 103 Stat. 1716, 1755 (1989).
153. The counterargument is that these wealthy contributors achieve the same result legally through
"soft money." It is not clear, however, that the candidates feel as accountable to soft money donors as
they do to their direct contributors. See, e.g., HEDRICK SMITH, THE POWER GAME: How WASHINGTON
WORKS, 257 (1988) (quoting then-Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole: "When these political action
committees give money [as direct contributions], they expect something in return other than good
government."). Not only is the influence of soft money mediated through the political parties, but there
are certain constraints on the use of soft money for the biggest need in a campaign-media advertising.
See MAKINSON & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 149, at 16. Therefore, the incentive to contribute directly
remains. If legal contributions are too small to make a difference, then the incentive is to contribute
illegally.
154. This observation is supported by the profile of legal contributions. Since 1976, with occasional
exceptions, the trend increasingly is for campaign contributors to channel their contributions through
PACs rather than to contribute as individuals. MAKINSON & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 149, at 6. In the
1992 House elections, for example, winning candidates received 42% of their contributions from PACs,
up from 26% in 1976. Id.
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such that certain benefits may be aggregated even further.' 55 Thus, the private
benefit of individual illegal contributions will be high when a specific legisla-
tive benefit analogous to a quid pro quo is sought, but it will otherwise be of a
moderate magnitude.
2. Social Harms
Although illegal contributions confer private benefits, they cause social harms.
There are two types of harm caused by FECA violations: (1) the harm that
relates to particular elections and (2) the harm that relates to public perceptions
about the legitimacy of the entire electoral process. The first is more particular-
ized: in certain elections, FECA violations could result in the "wrong" candi-
date being elected. 15 6 Although it may be argued that general underenforcement
would mean that illegal contributions could be offsetting, if illegal contributions
track legal contributions, those with an incentive to violate the law will be fairly
lopsided in their giving. 15 7 Even if the FECA violation were not outcome-
determinant, the violator may enjoy additional leverage vis-a-vis other constitu-
'58ents, 1  provided the candidate is aware of the violation. FECA violations upset
the balance, struck by the Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo 15 9 and by
Congress in the FECA, on the proper scope for the use of money in federal
155. For an example of how special-interest PACs successfully aggregate the benefits of legal
contributions by blocking reform legislation, see Jezer & Miller, supra note 142, at 481 & nn.38-40
(suggesting that for investment of $1.1 million, given to members of the 1992 Congress by the 36 PACs
that represent hard-rock mining, mining industry pocketed approximately $4 billion in royalties that
would have gone to U.S. Treasury had a particular Senate bill become law).
156. This assertion raises the troubling notion that a candidate increases her changes of winning if
she can obtain funds to get more of her message out rather than through the quality of the message
itself. Examination of the relation of money and message in winning an election, however, is beyond
the scope of this note. Nevertheless, campaign professionals perceive that the money makes the
difference in the outcome. While gathering reliable proof that campaign funds collected in violation of
the FECA can make the difference in the result of an election is not possible, anecdotal evidence
supports this assertion. See supra text accompanying note I.
If one were to be completely cynical, the candidate elected with the help of FECA violators may not
be the "wrong" candidate, if the candidate more able to attract illegal campaign contributions might
also be better able to obtain rents for her district. Under this view, perhaps the FECA serves only as a
test for resourcefulness.
157. For instance, in the 1992 elections PACs contributed to incumbents approximately 10 times as
much as to challengers. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT 1 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 FEC
ANNUAL REPORT].
158. That is, assuming the violator is even a constituent. The harm may not be the marginal
additional influence of a constituent, but the marginal additional influence of an individual or group
that, in theory, the candidate has no duty to represent. To accept the concept of "marginal additional
influence," one has to accept a correlation between the amount of money donated to a campaign and the
amount of influence that the contributor has with the representative. Influence is, by its nature, not
susceptible to quantifiable measure, but evidence suggests that contributions correlate strongly with
influence. See WILLIAM GREIDER, WHO WILL TELL THE PEOPLE: THE BETRAYAL OF AMERICAN DEMOC-
RACY 249, 253 (1992) (quoting Thomas Ashley, a 25-year veteran in the House of Representatives and
currently a lobbyist: " 'You put the money out and you collect at the other end.... Access is really a
cowardly word because legislation is the bottom line. Believe me, the money is not directed at access.
It's directed at the bottom line.' ").
159. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
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elections. The particular harm is not only in the support that the candidate gives
to political positions because of FECA violations, but also the lost support that
constituents who did not violate the FECA may have received but for the FECA
violation. In theory, like the benefits of FECA violations, the tangible harms
caused by particular FECA violations appear to be very remote. Take a congres-
sional election, for example. For an actual harm to result from a FECA
violation, it must first result in a maldistribution of influence with a particular
candidate. Second, the influence that is attributed to the FECA violation must
result in support or nonsupport for specific legislation. Third, that support or
nonsupport must make the difference in whether the legislation passes. Fourth,
even if the legislation passes one house, it must pass the other house and be
signed into law. Some might argue that even passage of "tainted" legislation
alone is not a tangible harm and action as a result of the legislation is required.
In practice, however, the harm of a FECA violation is much more immediate.
Without opening up the entire public choice/public interest debate about how
the legislative process works, it is fair to assert that in practice the difficulties of
meeting all the steps necessary for harm to result from FECA violations often
are minimal. It is not very difficult to focus the influence yielded by a FECA
violation into specific legislation. Interest groups that have influence often draft
the actual language of legislation.' 60 The difficulties are even fewer in the
typical "pork" setting, in which influence is focused to add a rider to legislation
that already is likely to pass.
Finally, the particular harms can be aggregated. Whatever limits can be
placed on the scope of harm done by influence gained through FECA violations
with a particular candidate can be overcome by gaining similar influence with a
significant number of representatives. 161
The second social harm-the general harm of public cynicism-is the evil
against which the FECA is specifically directed. 62 While a rough measure of
the general harm can be accomplished through public opinion polls, 163 there is
160. See Stephen Engelberg, Wood Products Company Helps Write a Law to Derail an E.P.A.
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1995, at A18 (describing how group of "Washington's top lawyer-
lobbyists" met with Republican staff members to rework language in bill that would limit E.P.A.'s
regulatory power).
161. This appears to have been the strategy pursued by the defendant in the Curran case. See supra
note 72 and accompanying text.
162. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26 (citing Act's primary purpose: "to limit the actuality and
appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial contributions").
163. Public opinion polls can provide a rough measure of the harm because the harm is defined as
the perception of public corruption in the financing of federal elections rather than the actual amount of
corruption, however defined, in campaign financing. Public opinion polls have shown that steadily
declining voter confidence in the election process is part of a broader decline in confidence in
government. See, e.g., Jezer & Miller, supra note 142, at 467 (stating that most major polling
organizations have documented sharp downturn in voter confidence in government institutions dating
back more than 15 years); Richard Morin & Dan Balz, Americans Losing Trust in Each Other and
Institutions: Suspicion of Strangers Breeds Widespread Cynicism, WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 1996, at AI
(describing survey results that show loss of public confidence in government).
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no means for directly correlating FECA violations with public cynicism about
campaign finance. Nevertheless, they cause serious harm if excessive because
the perception of corruption in the election process undercuts the legitimacy of
congressional legislation in general.
3. Magnitude
The particular sanction for a FECA violation depends on the level of intent
that the government can show and the amount of money involved in the
violation. 64 The maximum sanction for FECA violations is available in the rare
case in which the government can show that a large amount of money was
involved and the violator knew that her actions were unlawful. 165 In that case,
the Department of Justice could prosecute not only under the FECA, but under
an alternative felony theory. 166 The maximum penalty would be five years in
prison. Even when the government succeeds in securing a felony conviction,
however, violators rarely receive the maximum penalty.167 Under the FECA, a
knowing and willful violation is punishible by up to one year in prison and a
fine the greater of $25,000 or 300% of the value of the contribution. 68 For a
knowing and willful violation, the maximum civil penalty is the greater of
$10,000 or 200% of the value of the contribution. 169 Theoretically, this civil
penalty could be imposed in addition to the maximum criminal penalty, but this
would rarely occur because conciliation with the FEC is so common and
evidence of a conciliation agreement must be used to mitigate the criminal
penalty.' 7° Finally, the maximum civil penalty that could be imposed by a
federal court in a de novo trial, in which the violation is not knowing and
willful, is the greater of $5000 or the amount of the contribution.17' The FEC,
however, can and does settle for a lower civil penalty in conciliation agree-
ments. The vast majority of FECA sanctions are imposed through conciliation
agreements,' 72 and thus the effective magnitude of FECA sanctions is fairly
low.
4. Probability of Imposition
The fourth factor to consider in determining the effectiveness of FECA
164. See supra notes 39-41, 97-98 (describing standards for criminal sanctions).
165. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text (describing Justice Department's requirements
for seeking to impose criminal sanction on FECA violator).
166. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
167. Most felony convictions are the result of plea bargains, with sentences averaging closer to one
year rather than five. Donsanto Interview, supra note 58.
168. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(d)(l)(A) (1994).
169. See § 437g(a)(6)(C).
170. See § 437g(d)(3) (stating that in criminal action, "the court ... shall take into account, in
weighing the seriousness of the violation and in considering the appropriateness of the penalty to be
imposed" whether the violation was the subject of a conciliation agreement, and if so, whether the
defendant is complying with the agreement).
171. § 437g(a)(6)(A).
172. See supra note 104.
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enforcement is the probability of imposition, which, in this context, requires a
two-step analysis. First, one must determine the probability that a violation will
be detected. Second, if a violation is detected, one must determine the probabil-
ity that a sanction will be imposed.
The probability of detection depends largely on private parties with informa-
tion voluntarily filing a complaint with the FEC or the Department of Justice
because the FEC, the primary agency for tracking campaign finance informa-
tion, has limited tools for detecting a violation on its own. Until 1979, the FEC
had authority to audit congressional campaigns randomly. 173 After 1979, how-
ever, it lost this power. Thus, because it can no longer conduct random audits, it
can only detect a violation if it is obvious from the reports filed by campaign
committees, which is unlikely to be the case. 17 4 Violations, then, are likely to go
undetected when a violator's opponents do not invest resources in detecting the
violation.
Even after a violation is detected, the enforcement process can be very
slow. 17
5 A respondent 176 has little incentive to cooperate with the FEC.
17 7
Respondents can and do use their ability to prolong settlement negotiations
either to force the FEC to drop the case or to reduce the magnitude of the
penalty. 1
78
An additional, though less prevalent, constraint on imposition of a sanction is
the decisionmaking apparatus of the FEC itself. The Commission must approve
all enforcement actions, and in certain high-profile cases, the Commission has
deadlocked, thus preventing imposition. 179 Moreover, it appears as if the FEC
will have fewer resources to devote to enforcement. 8 ° Given the budget-cutting
mood in Congress, it seems likely that future, as well as present, appropriations
for the FEC will decline.
Not only is there a low probability that a civil sanction will be imposed, there
is even a lower probability that a criminal sanction will be imposed. Most
173. The FEC is required to audit all presidential campaigns. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 9007, 9038 (1994).
174. See ELIZABETH HEDLUND, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, JUSTICE DELAYED, JUSTICE DENIED:
THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION'S ENFORCEMENT RECORD 12 (1992) ("Experienced, sophisticated
candidates and committees know how to make sure their reports are completely in order, even if their
campaign activities are not.").
175. "The lack of deterrent force of the FECA can be traced in great part to its cumbersome
multistage enforcement process, under which many matters are not resolved in a timely manner."
Gross, supra note 99, at 286.
176. Potential violators being investigated by the FEC are referred to as respondents. See 2 U.S.C.
§ 437g (1994).
177. FEC Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 260 (suggesting that FEC is subjected to protracted
negotiations by "well-seasoned Washington lawyers who just want to drag a case out." The FEC will
wait for a settlement because it is expensive to go to court, but the FEC has little leverage to force a
settlement.) (comments of Elizabeth Hedlund, Director, FEC Watch, Center for Responsive Politics).
The General Counsel of the FEC concurs. Id. at 249 (comments of Lawrence Noble).
178. See HEDLUND, supra note 174, at 14.
179. Id. at 11.
180. Telephone Interview with Elizabeth Hedlund, Director, FEC Watch, Center for Responsive
Politics (Apr. 20, 1995).
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criminal prosecutions occur only if a felony theory can be used.181 Prior to the
Curran case, the Justice Department had limited cases meeting this criterion to
fairly narrow situations. 182 The Department reads the Curran case to limit the
scope for successful criminal prosecution even further. 1
83
Attempts to quantify the rate of enforcement produces inconclusive results.
Since 1988, there have been approximately 200 criminal convictions for FECA
violations 184 and 1011 conciliation agreements with the FEC.185 Without know-
ing how many violations went unpunished, 186 it is difficult to assess the
probability of imposition. Judged against the scale of the federal election
campaign enterprise, however, this appears to be a low rate of imposition. In
1992, for example, congressional candidates spent a total of $680 million raised
from campaign contributions.187 Of that amount, $188.5 million was contrib-
uted by PACs. 188 If there were no illegal contributions, the theoretically mini-
mum number of contributions in 1992 would have been 527,200.189 In the
1991-92 election cycle, there were 361 conciliation agreements reached with the
FEC. Thus, in 1992 the theoretically maximum ratio of enforcement was one
conciliation agreement for every 1460 contributions discounted by the number
of illegal contributions. This ratio, however, may be misleading for three
reasons: we still cannot tell how many illegal contributions there were; the
number of enforcement actions cannot be directly correlated with the number of
campaign contributions because some of the civil enforcement actions were
against PACs for violations that spanned more than one campaign; and the
conciliation agreements were not all for violations of the contribution limits.
While these figures may suggest a high degree of compliance with the law, it is
more persuasive, when considered in conjunction with the incentives for violat-
ing the law and the anecdotal evidence from the FEC's critics, to view them as
representing a low degree of enforcement.
181. Donsanto Interview, supra note 58.
182. See ELECTION LAW MANUAL (5th ed.), supra note 25, at 73-76 (limiting appropriate scope for
criminal prosecutions to violations involving large amounts of money and some form of deceit to
disguise violation).
183. See ELECTION LAW MANUAL (6th ed.), supra note 12, at 108-10 (stating that prosecution under
felony theories requires heightened scienter requirements, and "[t]he Curran case demonstrates that
satisfying these scienter requirements can prove challenging").
184. If this analysis were restricted to prosecutions brought solely under the FECA, this number
would be very close to zero. Donsanto Interview, supra note 58. It appears that the use of alternative
theories is necessary for any real criminal enforcement of the FECA, but I argue that this supplemental
enforcement still is suboptimal.
185. See supra note 104.
186. For victimless, white collar crimes, there can be no equivalent to the Justice Department's
National Crime Victim Survey, which estimates the number of unreported crimes that occur each year.
187. 1993 FEC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 157.
188. MAKINSON & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 149, at 21.
189. Assuming that all PACs gave the $5000 maximum and all individuals gave the $1000
maximum, there would be 37,700 PAC contributions and 489,500 individual contributions. The actual
number of contributions has to be significantly higher. For example, Barbara Boxer's 1992 campaign
raised $5 million from contributions under $200. Id. at 6.
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C. OPTIMALITY ANALYSIS
The above analysis suggests that current enforcement of the FECA is subopti-
mal; we currently are not buying enough.' 90 The goal, then, is to set potential
sanctions and levels of enforcement to reduce public cynicism to the point at
which the cost of further reductions equals the benefits of those reductions.' 9'
The private benefits from FECA violations depend on the contributor. Viola-
tions that involve a virtual quid pro quo yield very high benefits; isolated
violations that do not involve a quid pro quo, however, do not appear to provide
very large benefits. Nevertheless, because benefits can be aggregated by wealthy
violators, there appears to be an exponential increase in the likelihood of
receiving legislation sought through multiple FECA violations. The harms
caused by FECA violations are of two types: particular and general. In some
cases the particular harm can be quite grave-perhaps the "wrong" candidate is
elected. In others, the particular harm is fairly ephemeral. As with the benefits,
the harms can be aggregated such that violators who enjoy aggregated private
benefits cause aggregated social harm. The magnitude of the sanction most
often used, a settlement with the FEC, appears to be fairly low. In many cases,
violators can drag out the process to reduce the magnitude to an acceptable
level. 192 The probability of imposition remains conjectural because the baseline
amount of unpunished violations is impossible to determine. Nonetheless, the
incentives for violating the FECA, combined with the ability of violators to
avoid detection and, if detected, to reduce the penalty, support the argument that
the probability of imposition is low.
Deterrence theory suggests that when the private benefits of an action are
high and the perceived likelihood that a sanction for that action will be imposed
is low, the magnitude of the sanction must be considerably higher than the
private benefit of the action to deter a risk-neutral rational actor.19 3 With FECA
enforcement, even if the benefits are not great, the analysis suggests that the
harm is serious and the likelihood of imposition and the magnitude of the
sanctions are so low that we have suboptimal deterrence. Those familiar with
FECA enforcement tend to agree. 1
94
190. FECA violations impose serious social costs, and the current level of enforcement has done
little to accomplish the statute's goal of removing a public sense of corruption in the financing of
federal elections. While it is possible that the substantive provisions of the FECA, at any level of
enforcement, are inadequate for the task, that discussion is beyond the scope of this note. In this
analysis, I assume that the provisions of the FECA that place limits on the sources and amounts of
federal campaign contributions, if adequately enforced, are capable of reducing public cynicism about
campaign finance.
191. For the definition of optimal enforcement, see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
192. Presumably the violator pays a cost, such as legal fees, for dragging out the process, but this
cost must be less than the penalties sought by the FEC if we assume rational action.
193. See supra notes 112-14.
194. "[T]he FECA as currently written does not adequately deter violations of the statute. Many
participants in the political process believe that the election laws need not be heeded. The chance is
slim that violations will be detected, party-line deadlocks reduce the chance that the Commission will
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Considerations for optimizing enforcement, then, start with asking whether it
is possible to increase the likelihood of imposition or the magnitude of the
sanctions or both. One means of increasing the probability of imposition is
reducing the cost of information necessary for learning of and proving FECA
violations. Cheaper information allows investigators not only to learn of more
violations, but also to make their case against violators more easily. 1
95
Increasing the magnitude of the sanctions can also optimize enforcement of
the FECA. The high-magnitude sanctions available are incarceration' 96 and
substantial monetary penalties. Imposition of either, however, faces consider-
able obstacles. While increased criminal enforcement of the campaign finance
laws appears to be a tempting option for optimizing deterrence, it is not the
most feasible option. Increased use of the criminal sanction, though it would
increase the cost of the enforcement scheme, is attractive because potential
violators would more likely be deterred by a credible threat of a prison
sentence. 197 The cost of the enforcement scheme could be mitigated by keeping
prison sentences short because the opportunity cost of a prison sentence (lost
time and money) and the stigma effect would be front-loaded.
The criminal sanction, however, would only be optimal if FECA violations
were considered blameworthy. FECA violations would then be well suited for
increased criminal prosecution as a means of reducing public cynicism about
campaign finance. 198 When the FECA was passed in the wake of the Watergate
scandal, perhaps there was sufficient public consensus to consider campaign
investigate violations of the law, and any resulting penalty will probably come long after the election."
Gross, supra note 99, at 286.
195. See Coffee, Corporate Crime and Punishment, supra note 124, at 466-67. An increased rate of
imposition would also respond to the possibility that FECA violators may be risk-preferrers rather than
risk-neutral. To be effective, a FECA violation has to involve some group effort such that someone in
the campaign is made aware of the violation and knows to whom the campaign owes favors. Some
evidence suggests that this necessary group decisionmaking will result in a "risky shift phenomenon"
in which those involved will prefer risk to a greater extent than they would acting alone. Id.
196. While some evidence suggests that debarment-that is, banning a FECA violator from contrib-
uting in future elections-may also be a possible sanction, the Supreme Court would most likely not
allow it. Evidence supporting contributor debarment includes the fact that a candidate who fails to file a
required report of contributions and expenditures may be debarred for one year from running for federal
office. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 112-13 (1976) (per curiam). Further, even under a "rigorous
standard of review," limits on campaign contributions are permissible because the government interest
in preventing the appearance of corruption is sufficient to outweigh any effects on First Amendment
freedoms. See id. at 28-29. Nevertheless, the Court would probably hold that the government interest in
a ban on contributions from FECA violators is insufficient to outweigh the effects on First Amendment
freedoms of speech and association. Thus, I will limit the discussion of nonmonetary sanctions to
incarceration.
197. See generally Kenneth Mann et al., Sentencing the White-Collar Offender, 17 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 479 (1980) (field study of judges on the deterrent effect of incarcerative sentences for white collar
offenders).
198. See Coffee, Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal," supra note 133, at 223 & n.123 (arguing that
'empirical evidence is available to support the proposition that the criminal law is very effective at
teaching citizens what the contours of the public morality are").
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finance violations to be worthy of strict criminal liability. But as the courts read
into the statute an intent requirement and as the Department of Justice further
limited its enforcement to knowing and willful violations, the FECA became
less effective at deterring violations.
Pressure to improve enforcement led to the 1976 amendment that created the
FEC and severely limited the scope of the criminal sanction.' 99 Rather than
invest resources in increased FECA enforcement under a strict criminal liability
regime, Congress created the FEC to enforce the FECA through the use of civil
sanctions. It seems likely that this switch from enforcement exclusively through
a criminal sanction to enforcement primarily through a civil sanction was the
result either of a lack of public consensus on the blameworthiness of FECA
violations or a desire on the part of those who control the political process to
avoid increasing the use of criminal sanctions to appease public pressure for
more effective FECA enforcement.
In either case, increases in the use of a criminal sanction will not be effective.
If FECA violations are not considered blameworthy by violators or society,
those punished would not be stigmatized any more than the recipient of a traffic
ticket is stigmatized. When the threat of a criminal sanction does not also carry
with it the threat of stigmatization, use of the criminal sanction will be ineffi-
cient.2 ° ° If there is a social consensus that FECA violations are blameworthy,
but if the interests of those who control the political process are adverse to
effective use of the criminal sanction, the necessary legislation to increase the
availability of the criminal sanction will never be passed.
Because the threat of imposition cannot likely be increased, increases in the
magnitude of the monetary sanctions are the only remaining option for increas-
ing deterrence. Theory suggests that deterrence could be optimized by suffi-
ciently high monetary penalties for most individual contributors. 20 1 Most
individual violators against whom an enforcement action might be taken appear
to have sufficient liquid assets to be deterred by a high monetary penalty.
20 2
While the collectibility boundary limits the assets that can be reached in an
enforcement action, enough individual violators are likely to have enough at
risk to make a high monetary sanction an effective deterrent.
Ironically, the option of higher monetary sanctions is unlikely to be very
effective against those who have the greatest incentive to violate the FECA,
contributors through PACs. PACs have a legislative agenda and the means to
aggregate the benefits of FECA violations. The limited pool of assets held by
PACs reduces the deterrence value of a monetary sanction. Absent a showing
199. See FEC Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 234.
200. See supra Part IIA2 for a discussion of the effective use of the criminal sanction.
201. See Shavell, supra note 109, at 1236-37 (describing five factors to test whether monetary
sanctions will produce desired level of deterrence).
202. See id. (explaining why size of violator's assets must be sufficient for threat of monetary
sanction to deter).
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sufficient for a court to pierce the corporate veil, wealthy individuals who
contribute through PACs are liable for FECA violations only up to the amount
they have contributed.2 °3 While substantial sums flow through the PACs' cof-
fers, relatively little remains after an election. 20 4 Therefore, the collectibility
boundary for PACs remains fairly low.
Deterrence theory suggests that when there are insufficient assets to produce
the desired level of deterrence, a nonmonetary sanction should be imposed.2 °5
But the nonmonetary sanction of incarceration is unavailable against a corporate
entity and would be unlikely to be imposed against corporate officers because
the conduct is not considered blameworthy by the dominant groups in the
political process. Other nonmonetary sanctions have limited deterrent effect.
Penalizing a violating PAC out of existence probably would not have the same
effect as with a corporate entity committed to remaining a going concern; the
PAC could simply be resurrected under a new name with fairly low transaction
costs. There would be little loss of "goodwill" from a change in name, because
the candidates would still be aware of who was contributing, why they were
contributing, and what they expected in return.
In sum, enforcement of the FECA is suboptimal and appears destined to
remain that way. The unavailability of the criminal sanction as an effective tool
and the collectibility boundary for an important pool of potential violators will
keep deterrence at a suboptimal level. Nevertheless, frustration with ineffective
enforcement of the FECA can be mitigated by first taking measures to increase
the likelihood that sanctions will be imposed. Evidence that FECA violators are
likely to be risk-preferrers makes this step even more important because risk-
preferrers are more sensitive to changes in the probability of imposition than to
changes in the magnitude of the sanction. Second, because the cost of informa-
tion for detecting FECA violations and gathering sufficient evidence to impose
sanctions is likely to remain high, the magnitude of monetary sanctions also
should be increased.
III. OPTIMIZING FECA ENFORCEMENT
This Part suggests reforms that flow from the conclusions in Part II. To
increase the likelihood that FECA violators will be sanctioned, a number of
reforms should be made. In particular, the cost of information necessary to
enforce the FECA is too high relative to the deterrent effect of current levels of
enforcement.
203. That is, the contributor's donation may go to paying a civil penalty rather than to a particular
candidate.
204. A review of recent FEC annual reports indicates that PACs retain about 10% of the amount
donated in an election cycle as cash on hand. See, e.g., FEDERAL ELECTION COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT
(1992).
205. See supra text accompanying note 123.
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A. INCREASE THE PROBABILITY OF IMPOSITION
This note proposes five statutory reforms to increase the likelihood that
FECA violators will be detected and sanctioned. Congress should: (1) reautho-
rize random audits by the FEC; (2) authorize the FEC to impose civil penalties
directly rather than prove its case in a federal district court; (3) authorize limited
qui tam enforcement, by which persons with knowledge of FECA violations
could report these violations and receive a percentage of the fine in return; (4)
remove criminal misdemeanor sanctions from the FECA because they are
virtually unenforceable; and (5) grant the Justice Department exclusive investiga-
tive and prosecutorial jurisdiction over criminal FECA violations.
1. Reauthorize Random Audits
Currently, to detect a FECA violation on its own, the FEC must rely on the
reports filed with it. The FEC should be given the authority to conduct audits of
randomly selected campaigns in order to determine whether the financial reality
behind a campaign report is accurately reflected in the report. Prior to 1979, the
FEC was authorized to conduct audits of randomly selected campaigns. Theory
suggests that audits are an effective enforcement tool because they increase the
possibility of sanction by making possible the discovery of violations that
would otherwise have gone undetected.20 6 The randomness of the scheme limits
the ability of a probable violator to confine the risk of discovery. Commentators
close to the FEC enforcement process agree that the deterrence produced by
random audits outweighs the cost of conducting them.20 7
It appears, however, as if the very effectiveness of random audits led to
Congressional pressure to stop them.20 8 In the 1992 attempt to reinvigorate
campaign finance reform, a provision reauthorizing random audits made it to
the conference report, 20 9 but Congress never enacted the legislation. Relying on
complaint-generated enforcement alone undermines the FEC's function to pro-
tect the public welfare. Absent random audits, violators who do not have
opponents willing to complain will impose harm on the public with very little
likelihood of detection. The FEC's function is thus frustrated by the Commis-
sion's inability to conduct random audits.
206. See Shavell, supra note 109, at 1237 (stating that the lower the probability of detection the
higher the magnitude of sanction must be).
207. See, e.g., HEDLUND, supra note 174, at 12 ("Random audits can serve as a powerful deterrent
against violations and would be an effective means for the FEC to monitor compliance with the
laws."); Gross, supra note 99, at 290 (arguing that conducting random audits "proved useful ... in
monitoring FECA compliance").
208. See Gross, supra note 99, at 290 & nn.48-50 (indicating that combination of random audits of
powerful members of Congress, including a member of the FEC's congressional oversight committee,
and overzealous enforcement of minor violations uncovered by random audits led to congressional
decision to remove FEC's authority to audit randomly).
209. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 479, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1992).
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2. Authorize the FEC to Assess Civil Penalties
By authorizing the FEC to impose civil sanctions directly, Congress can
reduce the ability of FECA violators to avoid sanction. A FECA violator has
mixed incentives to enter into a conciliation agreement with the FEC. Appar-
ently many violators, particularly experienced violators, seek to prolong the
conciliation agreement process as long as possible.2 '0 To overcome this obstacle
to imposition, the FEC should have the power to assess civil penalties directly.
One of the bargaining chips that experienced violators know they can use is that
if the FEC fails to reach a conciliation agreement, it will either have to drop the
matter or prove its case de novo in federal district court. Allowing the FEC to
impose sanctions would shift the bargaining power significantly and increase
the likelihood that violations would be sanctioned.2 1' Not only would the
imposition of civil penalties expedite the sanctioning process and decrease
costs, but the FEC would be likely to win more often on the merits before an
administrative law judge.21 2
3. Authorize Limited Qui Tam Enforcement
Congress should take a page from early American history and enlist private
assistance in the enforcement of the FECA by authorizing qui tam
2 1
3 actions. 2 4
The qui tam action is a civil action that requires the underlying conduct to be
considered criminal. Therefore, qui tam actions under this proposal should be
restricted to the narrower scope of criminal sanctions proposed herein. 215 In a
qui tam action, the plaintiff pays the litigation costs and shares in any penalties
that are awarded. Recent experience with the qui tam action to expose fraud by
government contractors 216 indicates that the incentives thereby provided would
210. See HEDLUND, supra note 174, at 14 (suggesting that "lawyers who appear before the Federal
Election Commission regularly ... know they have much to gain but little to fear in not cooperating
with FEC attorneys").
211. This proposal has received support in the past. Gross has suggested the use of administrative
law judges to adjudicate matters and assess penalties. See Gross, supra note 99, at 287-89. The
Commission would then act as an appellate tribunal, and the Commission's judgments would be subject
to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act. Id.
212. "The prosecution obtains a decided advantage when it can try its case in an extrajudicial
proceeding before an administrative law judge operating under informal rules of procedure and
evidence." Coffee, Paradigms Lost, supra note 127, at 1887. For example, the common denominator in
administrative law judge decisions for enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission is that
"the SEC always seems to win before its in-house judges." Id.
213. See supra note 9.
214. " '[T]he public action-an action brought by a private person primarily to vindicate the public
interest in the enforcement of public obligations-has long been a feature of our English and American
law.' " Sunstein, supra note 9, at 174 (quoting Louis L. Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review:
Private Actions, 75 HARv. L. REv. 255, 302 (1961)).
215. The underlying criminal conduct would be causing false statements to be filed or conspiracy to
defraud the United States rather than a misdemeanor FECA offense. See supra notes 53-57 and
accompanying text.
216. In 1986, Congress amended the False Claims Act. False Claims Act of 1986, 31 U.S.C.
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also assist in exposing fraud by campaign contributors. 2 17
Overcoming the cost of information in detecting and prosecuting a conduit
scheme or an illegal bundling scheme provides the impetus for this proposal.
Creating a monetary incentive and "whistleblower" protection for an insider
who produces the information necessary to prosecute a criminal violation
reduces information costs. The proposal is designed to reach those violations
that merit criminal prosecution but would have gone undetected but for the
existence of the qui tam action.
Although Congress should create a qui tam action for FECA violations, the
statutory authorization for it should be narrowly drawn and strictly construed.
To do otherwise would pose two problems. First, the potential for mischief or
misallocation of the Department's scarce prosecutorial resources would likely
outweigh the benefits from qui tam enforcement. Prosecutorial resources could
be misallocated if qui tam authorization is too broad because a candidate's
political opponents may then have an incentive to bring relatively meritless
cases or cases of minor violations to the Justice Department merely to harrass
the candidate. By limiting the scope of qui tam enforcement to that for which
the incentive is a financial reward but for which there is little harrassment value,
Congress will minimize the probability that prosecutorial resources will be
misallocated.
Second, in some cases, a violation would have been reported without the
financial incentive, and the qui tam action might displace some of this "free"
information. Nevertheless, if qtui tam authorization is drafted with sufficiently
specific language, this cost can be minimized.
4. Remove Criminal Misdemeanor Sanctions from the FECA
The procedural obstacles to prosecuting FECA violations make the criminal
provisions practically useless.21 8 In addition, the prosecutorial policy of the
Department of Justice has further limited the scope for this sanction to conduct
that could be more effectively sanctioned with a civil monetary penalty.
219
§§ 3729-3731 (1988). The amendments "relaxed the jurisdictional bar against qui tam actions ...
increased both the damages and penalties recoverable and a successful private plaintiff's minimum and
maximum share thereof, embraced a 'preponderance of the evidence' burden of persuasion, and
eschewed any requirement of specific intent to defraud." Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutional-
ity of Qui Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 344 n.13 (1989).
217. Between 1986 and 1993, more than 600 qui tam cases had been filed compared to 20 such cases
in the decade preceding the amendments. Richard C. Reuben, Ferreting Out Fraud, Cal. Law., Dec.
1993, at 39, 39. The post-1986 actions have restored more than $440 million to the government in
fraud-based recoveries. Id.
218. See ELECTION LAW MANUAL (5th ed.), supra note 25, at 75.
219. See ELECTION LAW MANUAL (6th ed.), supra note 12, at 115 (stating that illegal activity that
involves less than $10,000 should be charged as FECA misdemeanor). While it is possible that conduct
involving such small dollar amounts could still be blameworthy enough to merit a criminal sanction,
enough large-scale violations take place that sanctioning these low-dollar violations with a stiff civil
penalty is probably more efficient.
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5. Give the Department of Justice Exclusive Jurisdiction over Criminal
Violations
Finally, under this proposal, the Department of Justice should have exclusive
jurisdiction over violations that are considered criminal. Parallel administrative
proceedings during an investigation of criminal FECA violations can limit
marginally the Justice Department's ability to succeed in its prosecution. For
instance, currently, the Justice Department cannot immunize from all sanctions
a person guilty of a minor violation in exchange for information needed to
prosecute a major violator. Even if the the Justice Department refrains from
criminal prosecution, the minor violator still is subject to civil sanctions. A
minor violator might be more cooperative if she could be completely immu-
nized from sanction. By granting the Justice Department exclusive prosecutorial
jurisdiction over criminal offenses, the Department can better succeed at secur-
ing convictions.
B. INCREASE THE MAGNITUDE OF THE SANCTION
While the potential benefits of FECA violations appear quite substantial,
theory suggests that higher-magnitude sanctions will factor into a potential
violator's risk calculus.22° In situations in which the benefit is more speculative,
higher-magnitude sanctions coupled with a greater probability of imposition
will produce deterrence that may begin to approach the social cost imposed by
FECA violations.
While it is not possible to propose an exact magnitude, the current scheme of
making the penalty a function of the amount involved in the violation is
inappropriate. First, the penalty appears to be compensatory, with the amount of
harm caused being the equivalent of the amount in violation. This, however, is
unlikely to be the case. FECA violators expect to gain more than they invest.
While their investments will not always pay off, large-scale violators who
aggregate the benefits of individual violations are more likely to realize their
goal. In many cases their gain will be society's loss. Even when views on
important public policy matters between legal and illegal contributors diverge
only minimally, the general demoralization about the validity of our electoral
process suggests that FECA violations cause serious harm. When the probability
of imposition is low, a penalty equal to the amount in violation for those few
violations that are sanctioned is unlikely to provide deterrence at a level that
will address the harm.
For these reasons, even if the above reforms were implemented to improve
the rate of imposition, the magnitude of monetary penalties should be increased.
Support for increased penalties is found among the commentators, 22' and the
220. See supra notes 112-14.
221. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 99, at 291 (arguing that "to create an effective deterrent [for FECA
violations], an increased likelihood of being caught must be coupled with higher penalties for serious
offenses")
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FEC apparently has pledged itself to seek penalties closer to the statutory
maximum in conciliation agreements.222
CONCLUSION
The Federal Election Campaign Act was passed to address growing cynicism
in the electorate about the influence of campaign contributions on who gets
elected and what decisions they make once elected. That cynicism seems to be
as pervasive today as it was twenty-four years ago. Suboptimal enforcement of
the campaign finance laws is one cause of the continued cynicism. Campaign
finance violators can reap substantial benefits in certain situations, either through
quid pro quo understandings with candidates or through aggregated benefits that
influence the shape and pace of legislation. The small magnitude of current
penalties and the small likelihood that they will be imposed, combined with a
violator's ability to maintain some control over the magnitude and probability
of sanction through the conciliation process, provide very few disincentives for
potential FECA violators.
Deterrence theory offers a useful analysis for suggesting some means to
optimize FECA enforcement. This analysis suggests that the harms from FECA
violations merit investment in fairly substantial deterrence. To produce that
deterrence, the magnitude of the sanction will have to be fairly high because the
private benefits are moderately high and information costs will limit the probabil-
ity of imposing a sanction on any given violation. This analysis further suggests
that a monetary sanction should be used unless society and the community of
potential violators consider the conduct blameworthy. Blame is a method of
announcing cost allocations in the political process, and in this case, those likely
to engage in FECA violations dominate the political process. Therefore, FECA
violations are unlikely to be considered blameworthy, which means that in-
creased use of the criminal sanction is not a realistic option.
Increases in the likelihood of imposition and the magnitude of monetary
sanctions are necessary but not sufficient to produce optimal deterrence. The
collectibility boundary for PACs will limit the deterrent effect of monetary
sanctions, and there are no suitable nonmonetary sanctions that would produce
equivalent deterrence. This limit on our ability to achieve optimal deterrence
under the FECA should inform our discussions of campaign finance reform. If
we cannot achieve optimal deterrence for the FECA, is it worth maintaining the
Federal Election Commission as an enforcement agency? Would some alterna-
tive regulatory scheme that is optimally enforceable better advance the FECA's
goal of reducing public cynicism about the role of money in politics? This
analysis suggests that an enforcement analysis should accompany reform propos-
als in the ongoing campaign finance debate.
222. FEC Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 260 (comments of Elizabeth Hedlund).
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